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Theuseof“most-favored-nation”clauses
insettlementoflitigation
Kathryn E. Spier∗
Many settlement contracts in litigation involving multiple plaintiffs (or multiple defendants) in-
clude “most-favored-nation” (MFN) clauses. If an early settlement includes an MFN and the
defendant settles later with another plaintiff for more money, the early settlers receive these terms
too. If the defendant knows the aggregate distribution of expected awards but cannot discriminate
among the privately informed plaintiffs, then MFNs avoid costly delay. Plaintiffs with weak cases
settle early rather than on the courthouse steps. The effects of MFNs on the settlement terms,
plaintiffs’ welfare, litigation rates, and the defendant’s ex ante incentives are considered and
alternative explanations are explored.
1. Introduction
 In the spring of 2000, MP3.com faced lawsuits brought by ﬁve major record labels: Warner
Music Group, BMG Entertainment, EMI Group PLC, Sony Music Entertainment, and Universal
Music Group. These ﬁve plaintiffs claimed that MP3.com, a service that allows users to listen to
music online, had infringed upon their copyrights. By the end of August, MP3.com had settled
withfouroutoftheﬁverecordlabels,payingeachareported$20million.Eachofthesesettlement
contractsincludedaso-calledmost-favored-nation(MFN)provision:IfMP3.comsettledonbetter
terms with another record label in the future, then the early settler would receive the better terms
too.1 Universal was the only record label that refused to settle on these terms. Early in the fall, a
U.S. District Court judge found that MP3.com had deliberately infringed copyrights, and several
weeks later, a judgment for Universal was entered for $50 million.2 Since the $50 million was a
“judgment” rather than a “settlement,” the MFN clause was not triggered.
MFN clauses are quite common in settlement contracts and, as in the preceding example,
typically apply to settlement payments only and not to judgments.3 This feature raises legiti-
∗ Northwestern University and NBER; k-spier@kellogg.northwestern.edu.
Thanks to Lucian Bebchuk, David Butz, Jim Dana, Andrew Daughety, Bruce Hay, Louis Kaplow, Alon Klement,
TomL yons, Leslie Marx, Jennifer Reinganum, Warren Schwartz, several seminar audiences, two referees, and Peter
Dicola for the MP3.com example. All errors, of course, remain my own.
1 The settlement also included a licensing provision that would allow MP3.com to continue providing the service.
See “MP3.com Gets Ripped,” Newsweek, September 18, 2000, p. 72.
2 Anna Wilde Mathews and Colleen DeBaise, “MP3.com Deal Ends Lawsuit on Copyrights,” The Wall Street
Journal,N ovember 11, 2000, p. A3. After liability was determined, Judge Rakoff ruled that the damages would be
$25,000 for each Universal CD that had been digitally copied by MP3.com. A second trial was scheduled to determine
how many of Universal’s disks were involved. The “judgment” of $50 million was actually negotiated in the judge’s
chambers on the eve of this second trial.
3 Florida’s 1997 tobacco settlement had an MFN clause that read: “The Settling Defendants agree that if they
enter into any future pre-verdict settlement agreement of other litigation brought by a non-federal governmental plaintiff
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mate concerns. In the words of one critic, “because [defendants] are ’straight-jacketed’ by the
most-favored-nations agreements with certain prior settling [plaintiffs], the strong public poli-
cies favoring complete settlement are being frustrated.”4 On the other hand, proponents of these
clauses argue that they are a necessary and desirable feature of settlement contracts.5 This debate
is echoed in The Manual for Complex Litigation,areference manual for judges presiding over
such cases, which states that “[MFN] clauses can provide an incentive for early settlement as well
as an obstacle to later settlement.”6
Formally,supposethatmanyplaintiffsaresuingthesamedefendant.Althoughthedefendant
knows the aggregate distribution of damages, each plaintiff has private information about the
expected damage award if his or her case goes to trial. Since all plaintiffs look the same to the
defendant, he cannot discriminate in his settlement offers. As in Bebchuk (1984), plaintiffs who
believe that they have sufﬁciently strong cases will reject the defendant’s offers to settle and will
seek compensation at trial instead.7 In addition to costly trials, there will be delay: many cases
settle on the courthouse steps (Spier, 1992). These “11th-hour” plaintiffs reject the defendant’s
early offers because they anticipate, correctly, that the defendant’s offers could only improve with
time. Through an MFN clause, the defendant induces these 11th-hour plaintiffs to accept early
settlement offers instead.
AlthoughthedefendantbeneﬁtsfromthecommitmentaffordedbyMFNs,thebroadereffects
of these clauses on the plaintiffs’ welfare, the litigation rate, and the defendant’s incentives for
care are more subtle. When the density function representing the plaintiff’s types is constant (as
with the uniform distribution) or increasing in a relevant range, then the terms of settlement and
the plaintiffs’ payoffs are higher and the overall litigation rate is lower when MFNs are used. In
this ex post stage, everyone beneﬁts from MFNs. Furthermore, the defendant’s incentives to take
precautions to avoid accidents at the ex ante stage can be restored at lower social cost through a
damage multiplier. When the density function is decreasing in the relevant range, however, the
terms of settlement and the plaintiffs’ payoffs are lower and the overall litigation rate is higher
with MFNs. Indeed, one can construct examples where the increase in the overall litigation rate
couldpotentiallyoutweighthecostsavingsfromearliersettlement,leadingtohigheroverallcosts
of litigation and delay when MFNs are used.
There is a growing economics literature on settlement of litigation with multiple litigants.
Che (1996, 2002) looks at the incentives for plaintiffs with private information to consolidate
their claims. Miller (1998) gives a survey of the economics of class action litigation, highlighting
the conﬂict of interest between the (often self-appointed) attorney and the dispersed clients he
represents.CheandYi(1993)considertheroleofprecedentinlitigation.DaughetyandReinganum
(1999,2002a)considersettlementnegotiationswhenthedefendantmaywanttokeepinformation
about the lawsuit a secret from future plaintiffs. Kornhauser and Revesz (1994a,1994b) look at
multiple-defendant lawsuits under joint and several liability, focusing on the externalities in
settlement decisions, and Spier (2002) looks at similar externalities in lawsuits involving multiple
plaintiffs and a potentially insolvent defendant.8 None of these articles, however, discusses MFN
clauses.
There is, of course, a large literature on the use of most-favored-customer clauses in supplier
ontermsmorefavorable...”Thefulltextmaybeviewedathttp://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/ﬂ/ﬂsettle.html.
Texas and Mississippi had similar clauses.
4 In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 560 F. Supp. 943 (Ga. 1979). I have reversed the identities of the plaintiffs
and defendants in this quote to maintain consistency with the text.
5 In the 1999 class action settlement of the vitamins price-ﬁxing case, class lawyers who drafted the agreement
argued that the MFN was “essential to the settlement and that without it the parties would not have reached agreement.”
See re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, This Document Relates to: All Actions, 1999-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶72, 726.
6 See The Manual for Complex Litigation @ 23.23 at 182 (3d ed., 1995). While this most recent edition of the
manual gives a balanced view of MFNs, earlier editions were more critical.
7 Hay and Spier (1998) and Daughety (2000) give recent surveys of the settlement literature. Spier (1994) shows
that trials must arise in every incentive-compatible bargaining mechanism.
8 Spier and Sykes (1998) explore the externalities between settling plaintiffs and debtholders.
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relationships.9 Most of this literature explores how MFCs soften price competition among rivals,
an issue very different from the one considered here.10 The article most related to mine is Butz
(1990), where best-price provisions mitigate the time-inconsistency problem that a monopolist
faces when selling a durable good.11 Coase (1972) argued that a monopolist selling a durable
good will not capture full monopoly rents for the following simple reason. If customers with high
valuations buy early on at a high price, the monopolist will lower the price later to sell to buyers
withlowervaluations.Ifcustomersexpectthepricetofallovertime,theywillbeinclinedtoforgo
early purchases and wait for the lower price.12 Butz (1990) observed that the best-price provision
is a mechanism by which the monopolist can commit not to lower the price later, and it allows
the monopolist to capture the full monopoly rents.
The use of MFNs in settlement of litigation has both important similarities and important
differences. The obvious similarity with Butz (1990) is that both articles hinge on the time-
inconsistencyproblem.Inthedurablegoodscontext,best-priceprovisionscommitthemonopolist
not to lower his price to make future sales. In my analysis, MFNs commit a defendant not to raise
the settlement offer over time. But the policy implications of the two analyses differ dramatically.
In Butz (1990), best-price provisions allow the monopolist to limit the quantity sold and therefore
unambiguously harm social welfare.13 Here, by encouraging early rather than late settlement,
MFNs reduce the costs of delay and may even beneﬁt plaintiffs and reduce the litigation rate.
The two games are fundamentally different. First, the pretrial bargaining game features common
values; a plaintiff’s private information about his damages affects the payoffs of both the plaintiff
and defendant should the case go to trial. Second, the passage of time before the ﬁxed trial date
does not “screen” among the different plaintiff types.14
Section 2 lays out the basic model where the population of plaintiffs is drawn from a con-
tinuous distribution. Section 3 presents comparative statics and evaluates the social welfare con-
sequences of MFNs. Section 4 discusses several important extensions, including multiple offers
beforetrial,learningabouttheaggregatedistribution,asmallnumberofplaintiffs,multiplegroups
of plaintiffs, and plaintiff bargaining power. Section 5 explores alternative explanations for MFN
clauses and discusses avenues for future research. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2. The model
 A continuum of risk-neutral plaintiffs has been injured by a defendant. Their expected
damages, x, are drawn from a differentiable density function f (x) that is positive on the support
[0,∞). I normalize the total volume or mass of lawsuits to be one, or
  ∞
0 f (s)ds =1 ,and assume
that F(x)=
  x
0 f (s)ds < 1.15 I also assume that F(x)/f (x)i sstrictly increasing.16 Each plaintiff
privately observes his or her own expected damages, although the aggregate distribution, f (x),
is common knowledge. That is, all the plaintiffs initially look the same to the defendant, so he
cannot explicitly discriminate in his settlement offers.
9 See the survey by Lyon (1998).
10 See, for example, Salop (1986) and Cooper (1986). More recent work along these lines includes Besanko and
Lyon (1993), Schnitzer (1994), McAfee and Schwartz (1994), and Marx and Shaffer (2000). Empirical work on this topic
includes Crocker and Lyon (1994) and Scott Morton (1997).
11 P’ng(1991)considersarelatedproblemwhenthemonopolistislearningaboutdemandovertime,andDeGraba
and Postlewaite (1994) allow for interdependent demands of the buyers, as would be the case when they are rivals in a
product market.
12 These ideas are formalized by Stokey (1981) and Bulow (1982).
13 Butz does say that the reader should not draw “sweeping policy conclusions” from this result. MFNs may be
necessary, for example, to cover the seller’s ﬁxed costs of production (see the discussion in the conclusion of Butz (1990))
or to mitigate the holdup problem (see Butz (1995)).
14 For more discussion of the relationship between settlement of litigation and the durable goods monopoly, see
Spier (1992).
15 This guarantees that a positive mass of plaintiff types will reject any ﬁnite settlement offer.
16 Thismonotonehazardrateassumptionassurestheexistenceanduniquenessofthedefendant’soptimalsettlement
offer in the commitment case, and existence in the case without commitment.
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There are two rounds of settlement offers before trial. In the ﬁrst round, the defendant
offers to settle with each plaintiff for S1. Each plaintiff individually decides whether to accept or
reject this offer. Plaintiffs who accept the offer receive their payment, S1, and exit the game. If a
plaintiff rejects S1,h owever, then the plaintiff and defendant bear costs cp and cd, respectively,
and move to the next round. In the second round, the defendant offers to settle with the remaining
plaintiffs for S2, and each plaintiff individually decides whether to accept or reject the second
offer. Plaintiffs who accept S2 receive payment and exit the game, while plaintiffs who reject
S2 go to trial.17 At trial, the plaintiff and defendant bear costs kp and kd, respectively, and the
plaintiff is compensated for his or her damages, x.18 We assume that cp, cd, kp, and kd are strictly
positive, so settlement negotiations and trials are costly. These costs would include direct legal
costs as well as opportunity costs such as the loss of managerial focus. Finally, I will let M1, M2,
and MT represent the mass of plaintiffs who settle in the ﬁrst round, the second round, and go to
trial, respectively.
This simple model can easily be generalized in several ways without changing the results.
First, trials could be risky in this framework. For example, let p be the probability that a plaintiff
will win at trial (which is common knowledge), and let y be the damages awarded to the plaintiff
conditional upon winning (which is privately observed by each plaintiff). Then the expected
damages awarded at trial is x = py and all of my results are maintained.19 Second, we may
interpret the trials for the plaintiffs as taking place either jointly or separately.20 If all plaintiffs
are originally part of the same settlement class action, for example, then plaintiffs who reject the
ﬁrst-round settlement in my model have “opted out” of the class.21 Finally, the model assumes
that the litigants do not discount the future. This assumption is made to simplify the exposition of
the article. If the defendant and the plaintiffs discounted time at the same rate, then all the results
would hold (the damages and the costs would be in present-value terms).
 Settlementwithcommitment. Supposethatthedefendantcommitstoasequenceofoffers,
S1 and S2,a tthe beginning of the game.22 A plaintiff has three choices: to accept S1 right away,
to wait and settle in round 2 for a payoff of S2 − cp,o rt oreject both offers and go to trial for a
payoff of x − cp − kp.
Lemma 1.G iven a sequence of offers, S1 and S2, plaintiffs with damages x ≤ x∗(S1, S2) settle
out of court and plaintiffs with damages x > x∗(S1, S2)g ot otrial, where
x∗(S1, S2)=max{S1, S2 − cp} + cp + kp.23 (1)
17 The careful reader may notice that the plaintiffs do not have the option to drop their cases before trial, an option
that a plaintiff would want to exercise if both S2 < 0 and x < kp. Additional assumptions on the distribution F(x)w ould
guarantee that the defendant would never offer S2 < 0, making the issue moot. See Nalebuff (1987).
18 Under the American Rule, each party bears its own litigation costs.
19 Risk neutrality is important here, however. With risk aversion, uncertainty introduces inefﬁcient risk bearing at
trial.
20 Importantly, though, I have assumed a constant returns to scale technology, where the cost of litigating a case
is independent of the number of cases brought. This is clearly not accurate as a representation of class action litigation.
Class members are able to take advantage of economies of scale, whereas individual plaintiffs who opt out would forgo
these economies.
21 See re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, This Document Relates to: All Actions, 1999-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶72,
726. In settlement class actions, as compared with ordinary class actions, the class itself and the settlement agreement are
certiﬁed by the judge at the same time. The class members therefore retain discretion to opt out at that point if they are
dissatisﬁed with the class settlement.
22 Although the defendant could commit to randomize, this would never be optimal. It is easy to show that if
S2 were random, then a truncated distribution of plaintiff types would remain in the second round. The assumption that
F(x)/f (x)isincreasingin x impliesauniqueoptimalofferforthedefendantgivenatruncateddistribution.Thedefendant
could reduce his total liability by committing to a single offer instead, one that induces the same cutoff.
23 The tie-breaking assumption is that a plaintiff accepts an offer when he is indifferent between accepting an offer
and going to trial. He may, of course, mix between accepting the early and the late offer.
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It is interesting (and important) to note that all plaintiffs have the same preference orderings
over the two settlement offers. If one plaintiff, type x say, prefers S1 to S2, then another plaintiff,
type y, will also prefer S1 to S2. The plaintiffs differ, of course, in their preferences between
settling and going to trial: plaintiffs with weak cases will settle and those with strong cases will
go to trial. This property implies that the passage of time before the last round of settlement
does not screen among the plaintiffs in the usual sense. In models of bilateral trade, for example,
high-valuation buyers strictly prefer to purchase sooner than their low-valuation counterparts.
It is not hard to see that the defendant will commit to a sequence of offers where nobody
settles in the second round. To see why this is true, suppose instead that a positive mass of
plaintiffs settled in each round M1 > 0 and M2 > 0.24 Since the plaintiffs are rational, they must
be indifferent between the two settlement offers: S1 = S2−cp. Using the lemma, there is a cutoff,
x∗, where S1 = x∗ − cp − kp and S2 = x∗ − kp. The defendant’s total payments are
S1M1 +(S2 + cd)M2 +
  ∞
x∗
(x + cd + kd) f (x)dx. (2)
Thedefendantpays S1 totheplaintiffswhoacceptintheﬁrstround(mass M1),hepays x +cd +kp
for those who settle in the second round (mass M2), and pays x + cd + kd for those cases that go to
trial. Since S1 = S2 −cp < S2 +cd, the defendant would like to shift the mass of settlement from
the second round into the ﬁrst round. This is easily accomplished with an alternative sequence
of offers, S 
1 and S 
2, where S 
1 = S1 and S 
2 < S2.B ycommitting to a sufﬁciently unattractive
second-round offer, the defendant encourages plaintiffs with low damages, x ≤ x∗,t osettle in
the ﬁrst round instead, saving both his own delay cost cd and extracting cp from the plaintiffs in
settlement. The defendant’s total payments under this alternative sequence are
(x∗ − cp − kp)F(x∗)+
  ∞
x∗
(x + cd + kd) f (x)dx. (3)
The defendant’s optimal settlement strategy is characterized by a cutoff, ˆ x, and the corresponding
settlement offer, S1 = ˆ x − cp − kp, that minimizes this expression.
Proposition 1.I fthe defendant can commit to a sequence of settlement offers, then there is a
unique early offer S1 = ˆ x − cp − kp and a late offer S2 < ˆ x − kp that minimize the defendant’s
total payments, where ˆ x solves
F(ˆ x) − (cp + cd + kp + kd) f (ˆ x)=0 . (4)
In equilibrium, M1 = F(ˆ x), M2 =0 ,and MT =1− F(ˆ x).25
Equation (4), the ﬁrst-order condition deﬁning the full-commitment cutoff ˆ x, may be un-
derstood intuitively. When the defendant increases the settlement offer S1 by a small amount,  ,
there are both costs and beneﬁts. The cost is that he pays an additional   to settle with all plaintiff
types below ˆ x,s othe cost is  F(ˆ x). The beneﬁt is that plaintiffs in the range (ˆ x, ˆ x + ] will now
settle in the ﬁrst round rather than go to trial. The mass of plaintiffs in this range is approximately
  f (ˆ x), so the cost savings on these plaintiffs is (cp +cd +kp +kd)  f (ˆ x). The optimal cutoff, ˆ x,
equates the marginal cost and marginal beneﬁt.
Finally, it is important to note that commitment is critical here. Since a truncated distribution
of plaintiffs, F(x)o n( ˆ x,∞), remain in the second round, the defendant’s second-round offer,
24 The case of M1 =0and M2 > 0i sv ery similar and is not presented.
25 This ﬁrst-order necessary condition is analogous to the one in Bebchuk (1984). The monotone hazard rate
condition assures that the solution is unique and that the second-order condition is satisﬁed. If S2 = ˆ x − kp, then the
plaintiffs would be indifferent between the two offers. Although it would certainly be an equilibrium for all plaintiffs to
accept S1,i ti snot unique. Offering S2 = ˆ x − kp is weakly dominated by S2 < ˆ x − kp.
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S2 < ˆ x − kp,i sn o tsequentially rational. Indeed, in the second round the defendant would
prefer to make a second-round offer that at least some of the remaining plaintiffs would accept:
S2 > ˆ x−kp.26 Anticipatingthatthesettlementofferwouldriseinthisway,however,theplaintiffs
with damages x ≤ ˆ x would not be willing to accept S1 = ˆ x − cp − kp to begin with.
 Settlement without commitment. Now suppose that the defendant cannot commit to S2.
We need to consider the continuation game following a ﬁrst-round settlement offer, S1,b ut before
the plaintiffs have made their ﬁrst-round settlement decisions. The strategies of this game include
each plaintiff’s decision whether or not to accept S1, the defendant’s second-round offer, S2,
and the decision of each plaintiff to accept a second-round offer, s.I ngeneral, each of these
strategies could depend upon the history of the game. The problem is simpliﬁed, however, by
three observations.
(i) A plaintiff’s decision to accept a second-round offer, s, will not depend on S1 or on the
acceptance/rejection decisions in round 1. The plaintiff simply compares the second-
round offer to his payoff at trial and accepts the offer if and only if s ≥ x − kp.27
(ii) S2 is chosen optimally by the defendant in round 2 given the aggregate equilibrium
distribution of the remaining plaintiffs.
(iii) Sinceeachplaintiffisinﬁnitesimallysmall,noindividualplaintiff’sacceptance/rejection
decisioncouldpossiblyaltertheaggregateequilibriumdistributionofplaintiffsremain-
ing in round 2. At the beginning of round 1, each plaintiff treats the anticipated S2 as
ﬁxed when weighing the three options—accept S1, accept S2,g ot otrial—and plans on
pursuing the option that yields the highest payoff.28
As a benchmark, suppose that the defendant makes a low-ball offer, S1 =0 ,and that no
plaintiff accepts this offer in the continuation equilibrium. The original distribution of plaintiff
types, f (x),wouldremainatthebeginningofround2.Thedefendantwouldsubsequentlychoose
S2 to minimize
  s+kp
0 sf(x)dx+
  ∞
s+kp(x +kd) f (x)dx.B yanalogy to the full-commitment case in
Proposition 1, the ﬁrst-order condition from this program gives a unique solution, S2 = x − kp,
where x solves
F(x) − (kp + kd) f (x)=0 . (5)
This solution, x,i sa nimportant threshold in the continuation game following S1.
Lemma 2.G i v e nS1, continuation equilibria exist and have the following properties:2930
(i) If S1 > x−cp−kp,theplaintiffsareindifferentbetweenacceptingtheearlyoffer S1 and
the late offer S2 = S1+cp. Letting x∗ = S1+cp +kp, M1 = F(x∗)−(kp +kd) f (x∗) > 0,
M2 =( kp + kd) f (x∗) > 0, and MT =1− F(x∗). The defendant’s payments are
(x∗ − cp − kp)F(x∗)+( cp + cd)(kp + kd) f (x∗)+
  ∞
x∗
(x + cd + kd) f (x)dx. (6)
26 The defendant would save his litigation costs, kd, and extract the plaintiffs’ litigation costs, kp.
27 As before, a plaintiff is assumed to accept the offer when indifferent.
28 We may, without loss of generality, restrict attention to pure strategies for the defendant. If he mixed in his
choice of second-round offer, then a truncated distribution of plaintiff types would remain at the beginning of round 2.
The assumption that F(x)/f (x)i sincreasing in x would give a unique S2.
29 The continuation equilibrium is not unique. When the early offer is high, as in case (i), there is an equilibrium
in mixed strategies where every plaintiff below the threshold randomizes between accepting and rejecting. There is also
a pure-strategy equilibrium that features a truncated distribution in each round. The lowest types accept S1, the middle
types accept S2, and the highest types go to trial.
30 This result is similar to example 2 (the uniform distribution) in Spier (1992). However, Spier (1992) makes a
further“skimming”restrictionontheplaintiff’ssettlementstrategiesinordertocharacterizetheoutcome.Seeassumption
(A1) in that article. The current article has proven results for two settlement rounds without this assumption and with
more general distributions of plaintiff types.
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(ii) If S1 ≤ x−cp−kp,thenallplaintiffsreject S1 andthelateofferis S2 = x−kp ≥ S1+cp.
M1 =0 ,M2 = F(x), and MT =1− F(x). The defendant’s payments are
(x + cd − kp)F(x)+
  ∞
x
(x + cd + kd) f (x)dx. (7)
Case (i) is of particular interest. When the early offer is high, some plaintiffs will settle early
and others will settle late. The intuition is easy. If all plaintiffs below x∗ = S1 + cp + kp accepted
S1, then the defendant would make a better offer in the second round: S2 > x∗ − kp.S othe
early settlers should have waited. If all the plaintiffs rejected S1, then the defendant would make a
worse offer in the second round: S2 = x −kp.S othe 11th-hour plaintiffs should have settled early
for S1.F o rS2 = S1 + cp to be sequentially rational for the defendant, it is necessary that exactly
(kp + kd) f (x∗) plaintiffs with damages x ≤ x∗ remain at the beginning of the second round. If
fewer than (kp +kd) f (x∗) remain, then the defendant would want to raise his offer above S1 +cp.
If more than (kp + kd) f (x∗) remain, the defendant would want to lower his offer below S1 + cp.
The defendant’s total payments in Lemma 2 are a continuous function of S1. Since the
defendant’spaymentsinexpression(7)areconstantwhenS1 ≤ x−cp−kp,thedefendant’soptimal
settlement strategy involves choosing a ﬁrst-round offer, S1 ≥ x − cp − kp, and corresponding
cutoff, x∗ = S1 + cp + kp, that minimizes his total payments in expression (6).
Proposition2.I f thedefendantcannotcommittothesequenceofsettlementoffersandMFNsare
not used, then he will offer S1 = ˜ x − cp − kp where ˜ x minimizes the defendant’s total payments
in expression (6). This value satisﬁes ˜ x > x and
F(˜ x) − (cp + cd + kp + kd) f (˜ x)+( cp + cd)(kp + kd) f  (˜ x)=0 . (8)
Theﬁrst-ordernecessaryconditionmaybeunderstoodintuitively.Inadditiontothemarginal
cost and the marginal beneﬁt described for the commitment case, there is now an additional
term. This third term represents the change in the volume of cases that settle in the second
round. If the defendant increases the ﬁrst-round settlement offer (and the corresponding cutoff
˜ x)b yasmall amount,  , then the volume of cases that settle in the second round would rise
by (kp + kd) f (˜ x +  ) − (kp + kd) f (˜ x). Therefore, on the margin, the associated cost rises by
(cp +cd)(kp +kd) f  (˜ x). Notice that this term may be either positive or negative, depending on the
slope of the density function.
In this section we have seen that, without commitment, a positive mass of plaintiffs settle
on the courthouse steps. Holding the cutoff ˜ x ﬁxed in Proposition 2, the defendant could strictly
reduce his total payments by committing to a low second-round offer: S2 < ˜ x − kp. Through
this commitment, all plaintiffs with damages below ˜ x would accept in the ﬁrst round, saving the
defendant money. Since delay is costly, the defendant is hurt by his inability to commit to the
sequence of settlement offers.
 SettlementwithMFNclauses. Supposeamassofplaintiffsaccepts S1 withanMFNclause
in the ﬁrst round and that the defendant subsequently offers to settle for S2 > S1 in the second
round.TheMFNprovisionobligatesthedefendanttopaytheearly-settlingplaintiffsthedifference
between the offers: S2 − S1.W ewill see that this obligation has strategic value: the defendant can
credibly commit to be “tough” and not raise his offer. Although this commitment destroys value
ex post (because settlement opportunities are destroyed), it is valuable to the defendant from an
ex ante perspective because more cases settle early.
Proposition 3. The defendant can achieve the full-commitment outcome characterized in Propo-
sition1byofferingtosettleintheﬁrstroundfor S1 = ˆ x−cp−kp togetherwithanMFNprovision.
Plaintiffs with damages x ≤ ˆ x accept S1.N ofurther settlement takes place and plaintiffs with
damages x > ˆ x go to trial.
AlthoughMFNsareaneffectivecommitmentdevice,theiruseraisesanumberofissues.First,
the practical distinction between “settlements” and “judgments” is not always clear. Defendants,
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for example, may try to disguise their future settlements as judgments in order to avoid triggering
an MFN. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, may argue that a judgment was, in fact, a settlement in
disguise. In the MP3.com case, Universal’s $50 million “judgment” was negotiated in the judge’s
chambersontheeveoftrial.Theotherfoursettlingrecordcompanies(unsuccessfully)challenged
its characterization as a judgment. “It doesn’t matter what you call it. This is a settlement,” said
one record executive. “If it walks like a duck, talks like a duck, smells like a duck, it’s a duck.”31
Second, MFNs are, in theory, just one of many ways of achieving commitment here. A high
ﬁxedpaymenttotheearlysettlersshouldthedefendantraisetheofferinthefuturewouldalsowork,
as would a contractual obligation to pay damages to some third party.32 The MFN, however, has
certainadvantagesovertheseotherdevices.Fromapracticalperspective,MFNshavethe“ﬂavor”
of expectation damages because they put the early settlers in the same position they would have
been in had they only waited.33 Consequently, judges may feel comfortable enforcing MFNs,
whereastheseothermechanismswouldraisesuspicion.MFNsmayalsofacilitateexperimentation
and learning when the defendant is unsure of the aggregate distribution of plaintiff types, an idea
explored in more detail in Section 4.
Finally, it is worth noting that the outcome in Proposition 3 is not renegotiation-proof. Even
though it is not in the defendant’s private interest to raise the settlement offer in the second round,
it may be in the joint interest of the defendant and the early-settling plaintiffs. If they could all
get together in the second round and seamlessly rewrite their settlement agreements to allow for
more settlement, they could all be made jointly better off ex post (although they may be worse
off ex ante). Renegotiation along these lines may be difﬁcult when there are many plaintiffs,
however. Each plaintiff would have an incentive to stick with the original agreement in the hopes
of receiving the MFN payout.34 And even if they could coordinate their actions ex post,i nmany
legal situations (a settlement class action, for example) it would require the approval of a judge.
3. Comparative statics and social welfare implications of MFNs
 In the previous section I argued that MFNs credibly commit the defendant not to raise his
settlement offers and so plaintiffs settle early rather than wait until the 11th hour. This has an
unambiguously positive effect on the defendant: holding the terms of settlement ﬁxed, MFNs
economize on the costs of delay. In addition, the defendant may change the terms of settlement
(and the associated cutoff), further reducing his total liability. The next lemma characterizes the
relationship between ˆ x, the cutoff when MFNs are used, and ˜ x, the cutoff when MFNs are not
permitted, and it serves as a basis for comparing the two regimes.
Lemma 3. ˆ x > ˜ x (respectively ˆ x < ˜ x, ˆ x = ˜ x)i fand only if f  (˜ x) > 0 (respectively f  (˜ x) < 0,
f  (˜ x)=0).
The difference between ˆ x and ˜ x comes from the cost of delay. When MFNs are not used and
commitmentisimpossible,thevolumeofplaintiffswhosettleinthesecondroundis(kp+kd) f (˜ x),
and the associated cost of delay is (cp +cd)(kp +kd) f (˜ x). This delay cost is a critical ingredient in
the defendant’s choice of settlement offer. When f  (˜ x) < 0 then the defendant has an additional
incentive (on the margin) to increase his offer slightly; fewer plaintiffs will settle in the second
round,loweringtheoverallcostsofdelay.Inthiscase,thedefendantwillchooseahighersettlement
offer with a higher associated cutoff, ˜ x > ˆ x. When f  (˜ x) > 0, on the other hand, then the
31 Derek Caney, “Record Labels Fuming over Universal-MP3.com Ruling,” dailynews.yahoo.com, November 17,
2000.
32 Note that this third party would need to be informed of the original contract and have full information about the
future offers. Legally, this third party would also have to contribute something of value in exchange for the right to the
MFN payout—there must be “consideration.” I am not aware of side contracts of this form, perhaps because they would
be very difﬁcult to write and even harder to enforce.
33 At least they appear to. If all plaintiffs waited, then the equilibrium offer would change.
34 Since plaintiffs are inﬁnitesimally small, any single plaintiff’s refusal to concede would not affect the future
outcome. Note that these ideas are similar to the holdout problem with tender offers in corporate takeovers.
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defendant faces larger delay costs when he raises his offer slightly and will therefore choose a
lower settlement offer and a lower associated cutoff, ˜ x < ˆ x.
 The effect of MFNs on the settlement rate. The overall rate of settlement is the volume
of settlement in the ﬁrst round, M1, plus the volume of settlement in the second round, M2.
When MFNs are not used, there is settlement in each round, M1 = F(˜ x) − (kp + kd) f (˜ x) and
M2 =( kp + kd) f (˜ x), and the overall settlement rate is F(˜ x) (Proposition 2). When MFNs are
used, all settlement takes place in the ﬁrst round, M1 = F(ˆ x) and M2 =0 ,s othe overall rate of
settlement is simply F(ˆ x) (Proposition 3). So we see that the overall settlement rate may either
rise or fall, depending on the relationship between ˆ x and ˜ x. The following proposition follows
immediately from Lemma 3.
Proposition 4. MFNs increase (respectively decrease, leave unchanged) the overall settlement
rate if and only if f  (˜ x) > 0 (respectively f  (˜ x) < 0, f  (˜ x)=0).
 The effect of MFNs on plaintiff welfare. Referring back to Propositions 2 and 3, the
defendant’s ﬁrst-round offer with an MFN clause is S1 = ˆ x − cp − kp, and the defendant’s ﬁrst-
round offer without an MFN clause is S1 = ˜ x −cp−kp.I tfollows that if ˆ x > ˜ x, then the plaintiffs
prefer the settlement offers under the MFN regime.35
Proposition 5. MFNs weakly increase (respectively weakly decrease, leave unchanged) the plain-
tiffs’ welfare if and only if f  (˜ x) > 0 (respectively f  (˜ x) < 0, f  (˜ x)=0).36
 The effect of MFNs on the total costs of litigation and delay. When MFNs are prohibited
and commitment is otherwise impossible, the total costs are
˜   =[ 1− F(˜ x)](cp + cd + kp + kd)+( kp + kd) f (˜ x)(cp + cd). (9)
In the ﬁrst term, 1− F(˜ x)i sthe volume of cases that go all the way to trial, and (cp +cd +kp +kd)
are the total costs borne in these cases. In the second term, (kp + kd) f (˜ x)i sthe volume of cases
that settle in the second round, and (cp + cd) are the associated delay costs. The total costs when
the defendant uses MFNs, thereby committing to settle in the ﬁrst round only, are
ˆ   =[ 1− F(ˆ x)](cp + cd + kp + kd). (10)
Using these two expressions, the relative cost savings from MFNs is
˜   − ˆ   =( cp + cd)(kp + kd) f (˜ x)+[F(ˆ x) − F(˜ x)](cp + cd + kp + kd). (11)
The ﬁrst term captures the beneﬁt of early (rather than late) settlement. This ﬁrst term is always
positive:acommitmenttosettleearlyavoidsdelaycosts,(cp+cd).Thesecondtermistheincrease
in volume of settlement, [F(ˆ x) − F(˜ x)], multiplied by the cost savings from settlement. Since ˆ x
may be either smaller than or greater than ˜ x depending on the sign of f  (˜ x) (Lemma 3), MFN
clauses may either raise or lower the overall volume of settlement.
Proposition 6.I ff  (˜ x) ≥ 0, then the total costs of litigation and delay fall when MFNs are used.
If f  (˜ x) < 0, then the total costs may either rise or fall when MFNs are used.
 Examples. Theuniformdistribution. Suppose f  (x)=0 .Comparing(4)and(8)weseethat
the plaintiff type who is indifferent between settling and litigating in the two regimes is exactly
the same: ˆ x = ˜ x.I tfollows that the overall rate of settlement is unchanged and the plaintiffs are
35 More speciﬁcally, all plaintiffs who accept this offer are better off, and those who reject the offer and go to trial
instead are no worse off than before. Without MFNs, plaintiffs would mix between S1 and S2 (they were indifferent), and
so we need only consider S1.
36 “Weakly” because plaintiffs who go to trial under both regimes receive exactly the same payoff in each.
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allequallywelloffunderthetworegimes.37 Thetotalcostsoflitigationanddelayunambiguously
fall, since cases that would have settled in the second round settle in the ﬁrst round instead.
The exponential distribution. MFNs may reduce the total costs of delay and litigation even when
the distribution of plaintiff types is everywhere decreasing. Consider the exponential distribution,
f (x)=( 1 /λ)e−x/λ.Astraightforward evaluation of equations (4) and (8) gives us closed-form
solutions for ˆ x and ˜ x:
ˆ x = λln
 
1+
cp + cd + kp + kd
λ
 
;
˜ x = λln
 
1+
cp + cd + kp + kd
λ
+
(cp + cd)(kp + kd)
λ2
 
. (12)
It is, of course, true that the overall litigation rate rises when MFNs are adopted: 1 − F(ˆ x) >
1 − F(˜ x). But it is easy to verify that the additional cost from more litigation is outweighed by
the beneﬁt of earlier settlement.
The normal distribution. When the plaintiff’s damages are normally distributed, total costs may
either rise or fall, depending upon the parameter values. Suppose that the plaintiffs’ damages are
normally distributed with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15. The sum of the litigation
costs is kp + kd = 40, and the sum of the delay costs is cp + cd = 10. When the defendant can
commit with an MFN, ˆ x = 115 and 83% of all cases settle in the ﬁrst round. Without an MFN,
˜ x = 120 and 91% of the cases settle, 49% in the ﬁrst round and 42% in the second round. The
social cost of MFNs here is that the litigation rate rises by 8% and costs cp + cd + kp + kd =5 0
are borne per case. The beneﬁt is that the 42% of cases settle in the ﬁrst round instead of the
second, saving costs of 10 per case. The overall cost, (.08)(50) = 4, is smaller than the beneﬁt,
(.42)(10) = 4.2, so MFNs reduce total costs. But, unlike the exponential distribution, this is not
always the case. Reducing the standard deviation from 15 to 5, for example, or changing the costs
to a more equal allocation where kp + kd = cp + cd =2 5both will lead to higher costs with
MFNs. The comparative statics are not monotone, however, and no general results for the normal
distribution have been obtained.
The binary distribution. Spier (forthcoming) considers an example with two types of plaintiffs,
weak and strong. Their expected damages are xL and xH, respectively, where xH > xL. When
the proportion of weak plaintiffs in the population is in an intermediate range, the defendant will
adopt an aggressive low-offer strategy when MFNs are used, leading to higher overall costs of
litigation and delay. (Note that this example violates the monotone hazard rate assumption in this
article.)
 The effect of MFNs on primary behavior. Up until this point, the normative analysis
has focused on the costs of delay and litigation. This may be too short-sighted. Imagine that
the defendant chooses precautions to avoid harm at an ex ante stage, where higher precautions
reduce the probability of harm (but do not change the distribution of damages conditional upon
an accident). Since MFNs reduce the defendant’s total expected payments, they will tend to dilute
his ex ante incentives for care.38 If the defendant has appropriate incentives for care when MFNs
are prohibited, then permitting MFNs may reduce social welfare.39 One should certainly not infer
that MFNs should be prohibited on these grounds, however. If MFNs reduce the overall costs
of delay—and delay involves a true waste of resources—then policy makers should adopt other
37 The ﬁrst round settlement offers are the same: S1 = ˆ x − cp − kp = ˜ x − cp − kp.
38 If the defendant was overdeterred to begin with, however, then MFNs would be a social improvement.
39 There could be a tradeoff: MFNs reduce care levels but typically save delay and litigation costs. Note that these
concernsmayberaisedaboutthedesirabilityofsettlementmoregenerally.SeeShavell(1997)andSpier(1997)forrelated
discussions.
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policyinstrumentstopunishcarelessdefendants.Policiesmightincludeataxondefendantswhen
cases are ﬁled, or the prudent adoption of damage multipliers.40
Proposition 7. Suppose that f  (˜ x) ≥ 0. Then there exists a damage multiplier, m∗ > 1, that
when used in conjunction with MFNs gives the defendant the same total payments as in the
no-commitment case but with lower total costs of litigation and delay.
The case where the plaintiffs’ damages are uniformly distributed illustrates the desirability
of allowing MFNs and restoring incentives for care with a damage multiplier. Recall that, in this
special case, MFNs do not affect plaintiff welfare or the litigation rate, although the delay costs
are certainly lower. Consequently, the defendant’s total payments (payments to the plaintiffs plus
the litigation and delay costs) are lower with MFNs. Now suppose that a damage multiplier is
chosen so that the defendant’s total payments are exactly equal to his total payments when MFNs
are prohibited. Since the total payments to the plaintiffs rise when a damage multiplier is applied,
the plaintiffs are better off in the MFN regime (with the damage multiplier) than they are in the
regime where MFNs are prohibited (and there is no multiplier). It follows that the total litigation
and delay costs are lower in the MFN regime than they would be in a regime with no MFNs.
4. Extensions
 Multiple rounds of settlement offers. For tractability, the model assumed that there were
onlytwoopportunitiesforsettlement:“early”and“late.”Amorerealisticframeworkwouldallow
a sequence of T settlement offers before trial, S1,...,ST, with associated positive delay costs
ci1,...,ciT, i = p, d.A sbefore, the defendant would like to commit to a sequence where all
settlement takes place in the very ﬁrst round and commitment is readily achieved through an
MFN. While a full characterization of the no-commitment equilibrium of this game is beyond
the scope of this article, the insights of Spier (1992) are relevant here. With no costs of delay, the
defendant would wait until the very last round to make an offer: all settlement would take place
on the courthouse steps. With positive costs of delay, there would be settlement in each round
and the defendant would beneﬁt from commitment. A closed-form solution is obtained when the
plaintiffs are uniformly distributed. In this case, the plaintiffs’ welfare and the litigation rate are
the same with and without MFNs, conﬁrming the results obtained earlier.
 Uncertaintyabouttheaggregatedistributionofplaintifftypes. Animportantassumption
in the model was that the aggregate distribution of plaintiff types was known. In practice, there is
often uncertainty about this aggregate distribution. This implies that the defendant may be able to
learn about the aggregate distribution after observing the volume of settlement in the ﬁrst round
and adjust his settlement offer accordingly.41 In this environment, MFNs can facilitate learning
by the defendant and provide the ﬂexibility to raise his offer to the optimal level in the future.42
Formally, suppose that there are N states of nature with densities fi(x) and cumulative
distribution functions Fi(x), i =1 ,...,N, and assume that Fi(x)=Fj(x) only if i = j.43 There
are T offers before trial, and assume that the costs of delay between rounds, cpt and cdt, are
negligible (although trial is costly). If the defendant knew the state of nature with certainty, he
would commit to offer S1 = ˆ xi − kp, where ˆ xi is deﬁned in Proposition 1. In other words, the
40 An additional lump-sum payment by defendants at trial would have no effect on the asymmetric information
here and so would not change the litigation costs or the plaintiffs’ welfare. Damage multipliers will, in general, change
the bargaining game in a meaningful way.
41 See the analysis of the durable-goods monopolist in Butz (1990).
42 Learning could also involve new information arising exogenously over time. A previous version of this
manuscript, dated October 5, 2001, and available on SSRN, shows that the main results of the article are unchanged
when the defendant’s liability is established at an interim stage.
43 One can make a similar argument for an inﬁnite number of states indexed by θ, where Fi(x,θ)=Fj(x,θ )i f
and only if θ = θ .
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defendant would “price discriminate” among the different states of nature. With the help of an
MFN, the defendant can implement this price-discrimination strategy when there is uncertainty
as well.
To see this, suppose the defendant offers to settle in round 1 for S1 = x∗ − kp with an
MFN,where x∗ = min{ˆ xi}N
i=1.TheMFNmakesitadominantstrategyforplaintiffswithdamages
x < x∗ to accept this offer.44 It is also a dominant strategy for plaintiffs with damages x > x∗
to reject it.45 The volume of plaintiffs who accept the ﬁrst offer, Fi(x∗), perfectly reveals the true
state of nature to the defendant.46 Modifying (A6) from the Appendix, the defendant will choose
S2 (and the corresponding cutoff x )t ominimize his continuation payoff:
Fi(x )(x  − kp)+
  ∞
x 
(x + kd) fi(x)dx − (x∗ − kp)Fi(x∗). (13)
Since ˆ xi ≥ x∗, the defendant offers to settle for S2 = ˆ xi − kp ≥ S1 in round 2. There will be no
settlement after round 2; the MFN serves to commit the defendant not to raise his offer further
once the optimal offer has been reached.
This simple illustration is interesting for a couple of other reasons. First, it is consistent
with the observation of MFN payouts. When the tobacco industry settled on favorable terms with
Minnesota in 1998, for example, previous MFN clauses were triggered and payments to Florida,
Texas, and Mississippi were increased $1.8 billion, $2.3 billion, and $.6 billion, respectively.47
Second, this example addresses the earlier point that there are other ways for the defendant to
achievecommitment—alargelump-sumpaymenttoathirdparty,forexample.Here,thedefendant
does not want to fully commit. Instead, he wants to retain the ﬂexibility to raise the offer in the
future in response to the information learned in round 1.
 A small number of plaintiffs. The previous sections assumed that plaintiffs were drawn
from a continuum, an assumption that is clearly unrealistic. Even large class action lawsuits
involve a ﬁnite number of individuals, and many lawsuits in which MFNs are adopted involve
small numbers of plaintiffs, such as the MP3.com case. This subsection shows that MFNs can
be useful in cases involving small numbers of similar plaintiffs, although they will not always
implement the full-commitment outcome.
To start,supposethatthereisasingleplaintiffwhosedamagesaredrawnfromtheprobability
density function f (x), and these damages are private information. (In the previous sections, f (x)
describedanentirepopulationofplaintiffs.)Thedefendantwouldliketocommittotheverysame
sequence of settlement offers speciﬁed in Proposition 1, but cannot do so. The reason why MFNs
worked so beautifully earlier was that they served as a valuable strategic commitment not to raise
the offer in the future. With a single plaintiff, MFNs are an ineffective commitment device.
It is not hard to see that MFNs can be effective with a ﬁnite number of plaintiffs. Here is
a stark example. Suppose there are N plaintiffs in total. Only one of the plaintiffs has private
information: his damages are drawn from distribution f (x). The remaining N − 1 plaintiffs all
have damages of ˆ x, the full-commitment cutoff, and this is common knowledge. The defendant
would, of course, like to commit to offer S1 = ˆ x − cp − kp to each of the N plaintiffs. MFNs
achieve the full-commitment outcome in this special case: After N − 1 plaintiffs have accepted
44 A plaintiff with x < x∗ is strictly better off accepting if the defendant’s offer were to fall in the future, and is no
worse off accepting if the defendant’s offer rises. Note that no plaintiff would be willing to accept S1 = x∗ − kp without
an MFN. The plaintiffs would all anticipate, correctly, that the offers would only rise with time. So learning would not be
achieved.
45 With positive delay costs it would no longer be a dominant strategy.
46 The result that the volume of plaintiffs who accept the offer perfectly reveals the state of nature to the defendant
is, of course, driven by the assumption that there is an inﬁnite number of plaintiffs. With a ﬁnite number, the defendant
would update his beliefs but would not learn the state perfectly.
47 See “States Suffer Tobacco Settlement Envy,” The National Law Journal, May 25, 1998, p. A6, and “Tobacco
Companies Sweeten Florida’s Settlement Pot,” Tobacco Industry Litigation Reporter, September 25, 1998, p. 6.
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S1,itbecomesprohibitivelyexpensiveforthedefendanttoraisetheoffertotheprivatelyinformed
plaintiff (assuming N is not too small).
The analysis is much more complicated, of course, when the N plaintiffs’ damages are
independentlydrawnfromtheprobabilitydensityfunction f (x).MFNscertainlydonotimplement
the full-commitment outcome in this case. If all plaintiffs happened to have damages above the
threshold, x > ˆ x,thennoplaintiffwouldaccept S1 = ˆ x−cp−kp andthennothingwoulddeterthe
defendant from raising his offer in the second round. Indeed, the defendant’s best second-round
offer, S2,w ould depend critically on the number of plaintiffs who accepted in the ﬁrst round.
This was not true in the earlier analysis. With a continuum of plaintiffs, the volume of plaintiffs
who accepted S1 is deterministic (by the law of large numbers). Although the defendant cannot
implement the full-commitment outcome, MFNs may be valuable in creating partial commitment
here. A formal analysis of this important case is beyond the scope of this article and remains an
important topic for future research.
 Multiplegroupsofplaintiffs. Themainanalysisassumedthatplaintiffsalllookedthesame
to the defendant. Consequently, the defendant was not able to directly price discriminate among
the different plaintiffs in the ﬁrst round—the same settlement terms were offered to each plaintiff.
Suppose instead that the defendant can observe the individual case characteristics that identify
each plaintiff as belonging to one group or another. The damages of the plaintiffs in Group A are
distributed fA(x) and the damages of the Group B plaintiffs are distributed fB(x).48
Atﬁrstglance,itwouldappearthatthedefendantwouldnotwantanMFNtoapplyacrossthe
twogroups.Sincethedefendantcantellthesetwogroupsapart,hewouldliketopricediscriminate
andcommittoaseparatesequenceofsettlementoffersforeachgroup,asequencethatisﬁne-tuned
to the particular characteristics of each group.49 This strategy can be achieved through separate
MFNs, one for each group. The ﬁrst-round offer to Group A might read as follows:
We offer to settle with you for S1 = ˆ x − cp − kp.I fw eo f fer to settle with anyone else from Group A in the future for
more than this, then early settlers will receive the higher amount as well. This only applies to Group A, however. We
retain full discretion to settle with plaintiffs from Group B on better terms.50
The problem with this strategy is that distinguishing between multiple groups of plaintiffs is
often tricky. First, even if the defendant could privately distinguish between a Group A plaintiff
and a Group B plaintiff, this information may be difﬁcult or impossible to contract upon. It is
common for exceptions to be broadly speciﬁed as litigants who are not “similarly situated” with
theearlysettlers.51 Consequently,thelitigantsmaytrytotakeadvantageofthe“similarlysituated”
clauseex post.First,GroupAplaintiffswhorejectthesettlementofferintheﬁrstroundmayargue
that they are not in fact members of Group A and should therefore be exempt.52 Second, suppose
the defendant gives members of Group B a better deal than Group A. If Group A can convince
a court that the Group B plaintiffs are similar to them, then they would be entitled to the MFN
payout!53 Third, the defendant may have an incentive to misrepresent the truth ex post as well. At
48 More generally, these two groups may have different litigation costs or other distinguishing features.
49 The desire to distinguish between groups appears in many other contexts as well. In natural gas markets, for
example, MFNs typically apply within the boundaries of each ﬁeld and not across ﬁelds. See Butz (1986).
50 The recent vitamins antitrust settlement agreement, for example, explicitly excluded vitamin B9 (folic acid)
from the agreement, allowing the defendant to settle in the future on better terms on these issues. See section 22(c) of the
Vitamins Antitrust Litigation Settlement Agreement. (United States District Court for the District of Columbia).
51 In the Corrugated Container price-ﬁxing case, the MFN clause was held not to apply to defendants who were
ﬁnancially constrained (so-called hardship settlements) or to defendants who were not indicted in related criminal cases
(who were presumably less culpable than their indicted counterparts). See In re Corrugated Container Litigation, 1983-1
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶65, 451 (1983).
52 This situation frequently arises in practice. In the vitamins case, for example, plaintiff Nutra-Blend argued that
it was in a unique position as a blender and suffered greater damages than the other class members and therefore should
be permitted to receive more in settlement. In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, This Document Relates to: All Actions,
2000-1 Trade Cas. (D.D.C. CCH) ¶72, 862 (2000).
53 In the Corrugated Container case, the defendants who settled early argued that the lesser payments made later
by insolvent defendants (the “hardship settlements” mentioned earlier) should trigger the MFN provision and entitle them
to a refund. The court disagreed. In re Corrugated Container Litigation, 1983-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶65, 451 (1983).
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the beginning of round 2, the defendant may try to argue that Group A plaintiffs who rejected the
ﬁrst-round offer are actually members of Group B. In that way, the defendant could get around
his earlier commitment not to raise the offer and extract some additional value in settlement.
In summary, the attempt to distinguish between groups can lead to opportunistic behavior.
If anticipated in the ﬁrst round, opportunism will tend to undermine the positive effects of MFNs
identiﬁed earlier. In addition, these rent-seeking activities may be costly in and of themselves,
as is evidenced by the follow-on litigation described in the last paragraph. For these reasons,
MFNs that attempt to distinguish between different groups of plaintiffs using broad language
may destroy rather than create value for the defendant.
Finally, MFNs may be useful across groups (in addition to within them) when the groups
have small numbers of plaintiffs.54 As discussed earlier, MFNs are completely ineffective when
a group has exactly one plaintiff and are less than fully effective with groups of ﬁnite size. If
the second group is not too different from the ﬁrst, then the defendant may want to pool the two
groups together and have the MFN apply across the two groups. This may be seen most obviously
when the ﬁrst group is very large (so the full-commitment outcome is essentially achieved) and
the second group has exactly one plaintiff. If the MFN with the ﬁrst group applies to the second
group, then it will commit the defendant not to raise the offer to this lone plaintiff. If the lone
plaintiff is not too different from the earlier plaintiffs, then this is a valuable strategy.
 Plaintiff bargaining power. The previous analysis gave the defendant the power to
make a sequence of offers to the plaintiffs. What would happen if the defendant were not so
powerful and negotiated the settlement terms instead? Consider a situation where the plaintiffs
arejointlyrepresentedbyanattorneywhoseekstomaximizetheiraggregatepayoffs.Theattorney
representingthesettlementclassactionandthedefendantarebothuninformedaboutthestrengths
of the individual claims, and they realize that the strongest claims will later “opt out” and pursue
independent cases.55 Since both the attorney and the defendant have every incentive to avoid the
delay of the settlement opt-outs, they would ﬁnd it in their mutual interest to include an MFN
clause in the class settlement contract.
If instead of negotiating jointly through a common attorney the plaintiffs negotiated
bilaterally, two important issues would arise. First, the formal analysis would need to incorporate
signalling on the part of the informed plaintiffs (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986). Second, the issue
of externalities would arise because an individual plaintiff’s decision to sign a contract with an
MFN will typically harm other plaintiffs in the future. These externalities are another reason why
thedefendantmayﬁnditinhisprivateinteresttouseMFNs,anissuethatwillbediscussedfurther
in the conclusion.
5. Conclusion
 This article has argued that MFNs are privately valuable because they commit the defendant
not to raise his settlement offers over time and therefore encourage early settlement. There may
be other rationales for MFNs, too. Some commentators have argued that MFNs lead to better risk
sharing.ThismaybetrueifMFNsleadtosettlementthatwouldn’totherwisehaveoccurred(since
trials are risky). But it is not true if the case would otherwise have settled for a ﬁxed amount. In
this latter case, the defendant and plaintiffs face less risk if they settle for a ﬁxed amount, and
are worse off if the settlement will be adjusted over time.56 Another rationale is that MFNs may
serve to discourage future suits. Since plaintiffs would be forced to bring their cases all the way
54 This argument would also apply if there were many plaintiffs represented by a small number of decision makers
such as lawyers.
55 In a settlement class action, the class is simultaneously certiﬁed for settlement and trial. The individual plaintiffs
later have the opportunity to opt out if they do not like the settlement terms.
56 Notice that these inefﬁciencies would be greater if MFNs applied to judgments at trial. See MacAvoy (1962)
and Broadman and Montgomery (1983) for discussions of risk sharing and most-favored-customer clauses in natural gas
contracts.
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to trial, it may discourage them from bringing the case at all. This does beg the question of why
this plaintiff would be able to extract a settlement offer to begin with, if his case is too weak to
pursue.
It is also plausible that MFNs may allow an informed defendant to signal his type to the
plaintiffs.57 The defendant might argue: “I am not liable for your damages, so I will settle with
you for a token amount. If it is ever determined that I am lying to you, and I settle with someone
else for more, then you will receive the difference.” While this signalling story may have some
appeal, it is not consistent with an important feature of most of the MFN clauses that we observe
in practice. The clause is typically applied to settlement only, and not to awards made at trial.
With this type of private information, a defendant could signal more credibly by making the MFN
apply more broadly to awards if some cases proceed to trial.
An interesting exception to the practice of restricting MFNs to future settlements and not to
trialoutcomesistheantitrustsettlementbetweenMicrosoftandthestateofNewMexico,wherein
New Mexico will receive the judgment or settlement received by the other states. Commentators
are referring to this as a “free-rider” clause, implying that New Mexico will “reap the beneﬁts
from a battle that others will continue to ﬁght.”58 While New Mexico is surely free-riding, this by
itself does not explain the use of the MFN clause. After all, the MFN puts New Mexico’s ultimate
recovery at risk. Why not settle for a ﬁxed amount instead? One answer may be that the MFN
commits Microsoft to ﬁghting harder in the future, a commitment that has good strategic effects
and may, in the long run, reduce Microsoft’s overall liability. Another may be that ofﬁcials in
New Mexico are concerned about “looking bad” in the event that the other states receive more.
Finally, some commentators have argued that MFNs may serve to drive competitors out of
business. In Chicken Antitrust (a price-ﬁxing case), plaintiffs entered into settlement agreements
with several chicken processors. Several ﬁnancially weaker processors refused to settle at the
same terms.59 The court was particularly concerned here that the defendants who were not part of
the early settlement would be ﬁnancially ruined by litigation, and that defendants who had settled
early would come to dominate the market in the future. The court struck down the MFN in the
Chicken case, arguing that the clause had “predatory intent.”60
Perhaps the most plausible alternative explanation for MFNs is that they can be an effective
bargaining tool when plaintiffs have some bargaining power, too.61 Intuitively, an MFN commits
the defendant to be tough in future negotiations, placing an upper bound on what a future plaintiff
can extract in settlement. This may allow the defendant and early plaintiffs to capture a greater
share of the future bargaining surplus. This tough commitment can backﬁre, however. The MFN
destroys the settlement range when a future plaintiff turns out to have a very valuable case. This
maybebadfromasocialwelfareperspective.WhencommittingtotheMFNexante,thedefendant
and the early plaintiffs do not fully internalize the ex post cost of breakdowns because at least
part of that cost will be borne by the future plaintiffs.62 These, and the previously discussed
motivations for MFNs in settlement agreements, remain fruitful areas for further research.
Appendix
 Proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3 and Propositions 2, 3, and 7 follow.
Proof of Lemma 2. To start, I will prove that S2 ≥ S1 + cp in any continuation equilibrium following S1. Suppose not:
57 Levy (2000) shows that best-price guarantees can be an effective signal of quality when a monopolist is selling
a durable good, and that these guarantees may increase social welfare.
58 See “New Mexico Cuts Deal with Microsoft,” The Seattle Times, July 13, 2001, p. A1.
59 This rationale raises an important question: If a defendant would be ﬁnancially ruined by going to trial, why
doesn’t he settle on the same terms as the others?
60 In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 560 F. Supp. 943 (Ga. 1979).
61 These ideas are very related to the earlier work of Cooper and Fries (1991) and Neilsen and Winter (1994). They
are also modelled in the earlier working paper version of this article, dated October 5, 2001, and available on SSRN and
in Spier (2003). See also the signalling model of Daughety and Reinganum (2002b).
62 The intuition is analogous to Aghion and Bolton (1987).
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S2 < S1+cp.Thenallplaintiffswith x ≤ x∗(S1, S2)=S1+cp+kp wouldaccept S1 andallplaintiffswith x > x∗(S1, S2)
would reject S1.F acing a truncated distribution on the support (S1 + cp + kp,∞)i nround 2, the defendant would make
an offer that the lowest remaining types strictly prefer to accept: S2 > S1 + cp.Acontradiction.
Case (i). S1 > x − cp − kp implies M1 > 0. If M1 =0instead, then S2 = x − kp < S1 + cp,acontradiction (since I
have shown S2 ≥ S1 + cp). It must also be the case that S2 = S1 + cp.I fS2 > S1 + cp, then no plaintiff would accept S1
(M1 =0 ,acontradiction). Notice that x∗(S1, S2) > x and (suppressing the arguments) S2 = x∗ − kp.
Now I will show that M2 =( kp + kd) f (x∗)i sanecessary condition for S2 = x∗ − kp to be the optimal choice for
the defendant. Let G(x) represent the cumulative distribution function and g(x) (which I assume is integrable) represent
the density of the plaintiffs remaining in round 2. Note that g(x)= f (x) for all x > x∗ and g(x) ≤ f (x) for all x ≤ x∗.
Supposethatinsteadof S2 = x∗−kp,thedefendantraisedtheofferto x∗+ −kp,where >0.Sinceplaintiffswith
damages below x∗ +  would accept this offer and those with damages above would reject it, the defendant’s continuation
payments are
(x∗ +   − kp)[G(x∗)+F(x∗ +  ) − F(x∗)] +
  ∞
x∗+ 
(x + kd) f (x)dx. (A1)
Sincesuchadeviationshouldnotbeproﬁtableforany >0,upondifferentiationwemusthave G(x∗) ≥ (kp+kd) f (x∗).
If this were not true, the defendant would prefer a positive   to raise the settlement offer.
Now suppose the defendant lowers the offer to x∗ −   − kp, where  >0. Plaintiffs with damages below x∗ −  
accept this offer and those with damages above reject it and go to trial. The defendant’s continuation payments are
(x∗ −   − kp)G(x∗ −  )+
  x∗
x∗− 
(x + kd)g(x)dx +
  ∞
x∗
(x + kd) f (x)dx. (A2)
Sincesuchadeviationshouldnotbeproﬁtableforany >0,upondifferentiationwemusthave G(x∗) ≤ (kp+kd)g(x∗).
If not, the defendant would prefer a positive   to lower the settlement offer. So we have
(kp + kd) f (x∗) ≤ G(x∗) ≤ (kp + kd)g(x∗). (A3)
g(x∗) ≤ f (x∗) implies (kp + kd) f (x∗)=G(x∗). Since G(x∗)i sthe mass of plaintiffs with x ≤ x∗ remaining in the
second round and all of these plaintiffs accept S2 = x∗ − kp, the result is proven.
Case (ii). Suppose S1 ≤ x − cp − kp.I tmust be the case that M1 =0 .Suppose not: M1 > 0. It follows that
S2 = S1 + cp ≤ x − kp and so x∗(S1, S2) ≤ x.A sbefore, suppose the defendant is thinking about raising the offer
to x∗ +   − kp. The derivative of expression (A1) with respect to   is G(x∗) − (kp + kd) f (x∗). Using the fact that
G(x∗) < F(x∗) when M1 > 0 and using the fact that x∗(S1, S2) ≤ x and the deﬁnition of x,w eh a v e
G(x∗) − (kp + kd) f (x∗) < F(x∗) − (kp + kd) f (x∗) < F(x) − (kp + kd) f (x)=0 . (A4)
We concludethatthedefendantwouldwanttoraise S2 inordertoreducehistotalpayments,acontradiction.Since M1 =0 ,
we are in the benchmark case described above, with S2 = x − kp and M2 = F(x).63 Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. The derivative of expression (6) is F(x∗)− (cp +cd +kp +kd) f (x∗)+(cp +cd)(kp +kd) f  (x∗).
When x∗ = x,then,using(5),thederivativesimpliﬁesto−(cp+cd) f (x)+(cp+cd)(kp+kd) f  (x).Thefollowingtwofacts
establish that this expression is negative: (i) the monotone hazard rate assumption implies that f  (x)/f (x) < f (x)/F(x);
(ii) using (5), f (x)/F(x)=1 /(kp + kd). We can conclude that the defendant’s total payments are falling in x∗ when
x∗ = x, and therefore ˜ x > x. Note that ˜ x may not be uniquely deﬁned. The results stated later do not hinge on uniqueness.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that the defendant offers S1 = ˆ x − cp − kp together with an MFN provision. If the
plaintiffs expect that S2 < S1, then plaintiffs with x ≤ ˆ x accept S1 and plaintiffs with x ∈ (ˆ x,∞) reject S1 and remain
in round 2. The defendant will rationally choose not to settle in round 2 with any of these remaining plaintiffs. Suppose
S2 = x∗ −kp > ˆ x −kp > S1. Plaintiffs with damages x ∈ (ˆ x, x∗] accept S2, and plaintiffs with damages above x∗ reject
S2 and go to trial. We may write the defendant’s total continuation payments as
[F(x∗) − F(ˆ x)][S2]+
  ∞
x∗
(x + kd) f (x)dx +(S2 − S1)F(ˆ x). (A5)
63 Intuitively, if a positive mass were removed from the lower part of the distribution of plaintiff types, then it would
be the case that S2 > x − kp.
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The ﬁrst term represents the settlement payments made to x ∈ (ˆ x, x∗]; the second term represents the total payments
made at trial with the higher types; the third term represents the additional payments made to the early settlers under the
MFN. Replacing S2 with x∗ − kp and rearranging terms gives the defendant’s continuation payments:
F(x∗)(x∗ − kp)+
  ∞
x∗
(x + kd) f (x)dx − S1F(ˆ x). (A6)
The derivative with respect to x∗ is
F(x∗) − (kp + kd) f (x∗). (A7)
From Proposition 1, ˆ x was deﬁned by F(ˆ x) − (cp + cd + kp + kd) f (ˆ x)=0 ,and so F(ˆ x) − (kp + kd) f (ˆ x) > 0. Since
F(x)/f (x)i sincreasing in x by assumption and x∗ > ˆ x,w eh a v eF(x∗) − (kp + kd) f (x∗) > 0. Therefore the defendant
offers S2 < ˆ x − kp and M2 =0 . 64 This conﬁrms the plaintiffs’ expectations, and the full-commitment outcome is
achieved. (This is the only outcome of the continuation game. If the plaintiffs expected S2 > S1, then x ≤ x∗∗ = S2 −kp
would accept S1 in anticipation of a future MFN payout. An argument similar to the one above shows that the defendant
would never offer to settle for S2 > S1.) Q.E.D.
ProofofLemma3. Comparingequation(4),whichdeﬁnesthecutoffwithMFNs, ˆ x,toequation(8),whichdeﬁnesthecutoff
without MFNs, ˜ x,w esee that equation (8) has an additional term: (cp +cd)(kp +kd) f  (˜ x). If f  (˜ x)=0(as for the uniform
distribution), then clearly ˆ x = ˜ x.I fˆ x = ˜ x, then combining (4) and (8) shows (cp +cd)(kp +kd) f  (˜ x)=0 .T aken together,
f  (˜ x)=0ifandonlyif ˆ x = ˜ x.If f  (˜ x) > 0,then(cp+cd)(kp+kd) f  (˜ x) > 0inequation(8),andsoitmustbethecasethat
F(˜ x)−(cp+cd+kp+kd) f (˜ x) < 0.Usingtheassumptionthat F(x)/f (x)isincreasinginx,weseethat ˆ x > ˜ x.Nowsuppose
that ˆ x > ˜ x.Since F(x)/f (x)isincreasinginx,wehaveF(ˆ x)−(cp+cd+kp+kd) f (ˆ x)=0> F(˜ x)−(cp+cd+kp+kd) f (˜ x).
It follows from equation (12) that (cp +cd)(kp +kd) f  (˜ x) > 0. Taken together, f  (˜ x) > 0i fand only if ˆ x > ˜ x. The proof
that f  (˜ x) < 0i fand only if ˆ x < ˜ x is analogous, and we are done. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. Let the damage multiplier be m. Let ˆ V(m) represent all of the payments made by the defendant
whenMFNsareused. ˆ V(m)equalsthedefendant’sdirectpaymentstotheplaintiffsplusthedefendant’sdelayandlitigation
costs. Let ˆ  (m)b ethe aggregate payoffs received by the plaintiffs. ˆ  (m) equals the settlements and judgments received
from the defendant minus the plaintiffs’ relevant delay and litigation costs. We may write ˆ V(m)= ˆ  (m)+ ˆ  (m), where
ˆ  (m) are the total costs of litigation and delay (as deﬁned earlier). Similarly, we let ˜ V = ˜   + ˜   be the defendant’s total
payments when MFNs are prohibited. Since f  (˜ x) ≥ 0b yassumption, we know from Proposition 5 that ˆ  (1) ≥ ˜   and
from Proposition 6 that ˆ  (1) < ˜  . Since ˆ V(1) < ˜ V and ˆ V  (m) > 0 (easily shown with the envelope theorem), we know
that there exists a damage multiplier where ˆ V(m∗)= ˜ V,o r ˆ  (m∗)+ ˆ  (m∗)= ˜  + ˜  . Since ˆ   (m) > 0 (the plaintiffs are
better off with higher damage multipliers) we know that ˆ  (m∗) > ˆ  (1) > ˜  . Therefore ˆ  (m∗) < ˜  , and we are done.
Q.E.D.
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